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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FREEDOM AND NECESSITY IN MARXIST SOCIALIST THEORY

A THESIS

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RONALD ANTHONY HALL, B.Ed., B.A.

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ABSTRACT

A library investigation of Marxist literature, both classical and contemporary, reveals the presence of two irreconcilable Marxian theories of social development. One view is based upon the philosophic proposition that social life is determined by necessity; the other view is based upon the assumption that there exists a degree of freedom in an otherwise determined world. These two contradictory philosophic assumptions are evident in the Marxist exposition of its major tenets including its concept of the role of the individual in history, its theory of classes, of the State, of Imperialism, and of alienation.

The acceptance of one or the other of these two opposing views has important consequences for the meaning of Marxian socialist theory and practice. For, if the view that social development occurs solely according to necessity, then socialist theory and practice is to be formulated according to the assumption, that because free will is denied, human behaviour is amoral, that conscious political struggle and persuasion is impotent, and that man is irrational. If, on the other hand the position is taken that social development is characterized by both freedom and necessity, then morality, political activity and rationality may be significant factors in Marxian socialist theory and practice. There is the further consequence of this latter position that Marxist claims for a 'scientific socialism' must be qualified by that

element of indeterminism which results where freedom exists. On a basis of its own theory and practice, including its analysis of historical events, it is evident that Marxism finds a strictly determinist theory inadequate and unrealistic.

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THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON
FROM 1630 TO 1800
BY
J. B. HARRIS

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Chapter I

Freedom and Necessity in Marxist Socialist Theory

The history of philosophic thought has been one of continuous quest for an understanding of the nature of the world, of the nature of man's existence, of the relationships which exist between man and man and between man and nature. Philosophers have said a great number of things about the nature of human life and the world in general. What they have said depends, for the most part, on certain underlying assumptions, frequently drawn from their metaphysical view of the world. Whether the world is matter or spirit, whether there is both a world of material experience and a world beyond human senses, whether there is a supernatural agency or not, whether there is an order in the universe or chaos, all of these views will be reflected in the philosopher's concept of man and of human existence.

From out of the diversity and complexity of the phenomena of the material world and of life, many philosophers have attempted to find some sort of general principle which would explain the order or disorder of human development. Of course, not only philosophers have been involved in this quest: theologians and scientists as well have been devoted to this task. What the theologian concludes about human existence depends to a great extent on his view of the nature of a supernatural agency; the physical scientist, generally, seeks some sort of order in

the material world which he can formulate in scientific principle or law, and the social scientist will attempt to do the same, perhaps in a more limited way.


Whatever may be the object of their endeavours, the philosopher, the theologian, and the scientist are likely to be governed by certain basic assumptions about the nature of the world and of life in it. In social philosophy, in the quest for an understanding of the nature of man and his society, and of his relationship to the material world, one of the most important concepts is that of Freedom and Necessity. Whether he is concerned to elaborate a "world view", a general description of social phenomena as a whole or whether he is concerned to describe the nature of a particular aspect such as the characteristic of a moral order, the philosopher is likely to be directed in his thinking by his acceptance or rejection of the existence of Freedom and Necessity.

There have been a variety of ways in which the concept of Necessity has found expression in both philosophy and science. Generally, Necessity assumes that the universe can be understood in terms of law, that there is a relationship between events in the world which conform to some sort of order. This view is commonly associated with the notion of causality; the view that the order of the universe may be understood in terms of cause-effect relationships, and that these relationships are necessary in the sense that if one event occurs, then another event

must occur. Thus in its logical formulation the cause-effect relationship is expressed in if-then form. It is in this sense that causal necessity, or necessary events or relationships may be expressed.

There is also another concept which is closely related to that of Necessity - the notion of determinism. As in the idea of Necessity, determinism accepts the view that the universe operates according to pattern or law; sometimes, however, it expresses a more general view to indicate that the quality and direction of life are dependent upon and conditioned by a complex of causal relationships. Some philosophers regard difficulties in understanding fully the conditions which have determined certain social phenomena, not a result of the absence of determinism, but to the sheer complexity of all the forces, material and social, which combine to shape human development. Nevertheless they would argue that human history is to be understood on a basis of our knowledge of its determining conditions.

The importance of the concept of Necessity is great in both its scientific and philosophic application. It is commonly accepted that the advances of the physical sciences have relied upon the function of these sciences to formulate laws and principles based on necessary cause-effect relationships. The acceptance of the view that there exists in the universe certain regulated patterns is important in governing what the scientist



looks for, not only in describing what has happened but also what will happen. For the formulation of necessary physical or natural laws is frequently related to the problem of prediction; it is the nature of such laws that they are applicable to an understanding of the future as well.

Something of the acceptance of Necessity as it has been employed by the physical sciences has been adopted by the social sciences, including psychology. Many of the difficulties encountered by the social sciences in their attempt to formulated laws of necessity have been attributed to the complexity of the social world itself, to problems in establishing experimental conditions and control, and to difficulties in assessing observations. All of these procedures have been important to the physical scientists. Nevertheless many social scientists attempt to maintain their discipline within the tradition of causal necessity. One of the most important such views are those advanced by Sigmund Freud's psychology; for Freud's psychological theories rest upon the assumption that the individual and social life are determined. The tradition of the physical scientist, with respect to causal necessity at least, is transferred to a study of social phenomena.

Many scientists and philosophers, however, accept as a part of the nature of the world the presence of

accident. According to the principle of accident, events occur in the world which do not occur in a necessary, causal order. There is for example, in this view no necessary causal relation between a particular hail storm and the particular destruction of the crop on which the hail falls. Such a sequence of events are not necessary but rather accidental. In recent time there has been among physical scientists considerable discussion regarding the presence in the world of events which do not conform to the traditional cause-effect relationship. The advent of studies in quantum mechanics and in nuclear physics have shown that some events, such as the motion of atoms in particular circumstances, do not occur according to any discernible regular pattern. These discoveries have led scientists to adopt laws of probability, rather than laws of strict necessity. In necessary laws there are no exceptions; in probability laws the presence and possibility of exceptions are allowed for. In the logical formulation of laws of probability, events are described not in simple if-then always terms, but in if-then in a certain percentage of cases. It follows from this that where the element of probability occurs, there exists a degree of difficulty in making prediction. The presence of accident and probability of events in the world has important consequences for the philosopher and scientist. For it is likely to engage their interest in the problem of what it is possible for man to

know with certainty, if anything.¹

There is a sense in which the concept of accident and of probability are expressed in terms of freedom. There are events which occur undetermined by necessary causal relationships; they are free in that they do not conform to a necessarily regulated order or pattern. In this sense freedom is taken to express activity in a way opposite to that expressed by necessity. There is however an additional meaning given to the concept of freedom, particularly in social philosophy. In attempting to understand the nature of man, many philosophers ascribe to man the possession of free will. According to this view, man may behave in a way which is not subject necessarily to determining conditions or to necessary causal relations. Yet such behaviour cannot be attributed to accident; rather man is capable of making decisions, of acting according to the dictates of his own will, of making changes in his own nature and in the environment in which he finds himself. Frequently associated with this concept, often as evidence of human freedom, is the presence in the world and in human activity, of alternative choices. For man there are choices to be made, and man makes them. And in the choices that man does make, whether it is ordering a meal or deciding on what sort of moral act to perform, he is not a completely determined creature - his thoughts and actions do not follow a determined,

1. Reichenback, Hans, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958, Ch. 10.

necessary law of cause and effect. Some philosophies, Existentialism for example, argue that man is completely free (if he has the understanding) to make moral choices independent of the material, environmental world.

But whatever degree of freedom is allowed, the concept of freedom, the presence in human life of the function of free will, is commonly regarded ^{as} ~~to be~~ related to human reason. By virtue of his ability to reason man is free to make certain choices and to act according to these choices. The success or failure of reason is subject not merely to material conditions but also to human will. Thus to say that man is a rational animal is to attribute to him more than what one could if he were determined in his thoughts and actions by necessary laws.

Thus the acceptance of one or the other of the concepts of Freedom and Necessity is likely to be reflected in the answers philosophers give to questions about the nature of human existence and of the social world. What sort of creature is man? Does he grow and develop, think and act, according to determining conditions which may be understood in a complex of cause and effect relations; or is he free to think and act independently, of necessary causal laws? The same sort of query may be directed by the philosopher to the study of history. Is human history to be understood in terms of laws of necessity and of accident, perhaps just as in biology a study of a plant may be made, or does man

influence history as a result of the introduction into the historical process of his own free will?

The acceptance of either Necessity or Freedom has an important consequence for the philosopher in his concept of morality. For most philosophers, the very nature of morality requires for its maintenance the presence in human existence of freedom. For in this view the belief that all phenomena is determined and operates according to necessity constitutes a denial of morality. For if a person thinks and acts in a way independent of his own will, then it can not make sense to describe his behaviour in terms of moral right or wrong; he has behaved in a way which was determined for him, in a way in which he had to behave. This consequence is further revealed in a discussion of the problem of moral responsibility. It is commonly recognized that individuals may behave in a way over which they have no control, where they are governed by physical or psychological causes which allow them no free choice of action; in such cases these individuals are not to be held as being morally responsible. The recognition of this aspect of human behaviour has become of considerable importance, for example, in the philosophy of law and in the conduct of the courts. A man cannot be held morally responsible for his actions if he could not have acted in any other way. Thus morality derives something of its meaning from the admission of freedom into our concept of human life.

In the "world views" of most philosophers there exists the presence of both Freedom and Necessity. Man is both determined and free, as is the social world in which he lives. E. H. Carr has given expression to this view: "All human judgment like all human action is involved in the logical dilemma of determinism and free will. The human being is indissolubly bound, in both his actions and his judgments, by a chain of causation reaching far back into the past; yet he has a qualified power to break the chain at a given point - the present - and so alter the future. In common-sense language, he can decide and judge for himself; but only up to a certain point; for the past limits and determines his decision and his judgment in innumerable ways."² There are limits to what any individual or any society can do. Man is not free to change some of the material conditions in which he lives; he is not able to alter the fact that he is dependent upon his material world for his existence. He is not able, for example, to deny the existence of the material forces of gravity. But he is able to understand something about how gravity works, and with this knowledge he can extend the bounds of his freedom. With a knowledge of aerodynamics and with the development of technology man has been able to fly - and presently he is learning how to escape the gravitational pull of the earth altogether, thus extending the bounds of his freedom of activity.

2. Carr, Edward Hallett, The New Society, Macmillan and Co., London, 1951, p. 14.



Philosophic speculation of the presence of freedom and necessity in the world is a matter of practical significance in shaping man's conception of himself and of the limits of his potentiality. It is, for example, a necessary condition for human survival that man must produce from the material world the requirements of life. This necessary production has meant work. Yet man has long sought to control nature and production in such a way as to release him from labor and the protect him from threats to his survival. There is in this quest a vision of the possibilities of freedom which has stimulated the imagination. Is work a necessary condition for human survival? If so what are the limits to which productive developments can be taken to release men from work? What sort of productive organization is most conducive to offering the greatest degree of freedom? The answers to such practical questions as these are at least to some extent based on assumptions about the presence in the world of either freedom or necessity or both. In discussing such problems as these, the Socialist Union has given a concise and apt description of man's struggle for freedom; "Man is constantly involved in a struggle with nature, including his own nature, to broaden the bounds of his freedom."³

As Karl Popper in his The Open Society and Its

3. Socialist Union, Twentieth Century Socialism, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1956, p. 38.

Enemies has noted, Marx has given specific expression to the view that in the social world there exists both freedom and necessity. He has described the social world as containing within it a "kingdom of necessity" and a "kingdom of freedom".⁴ Not only does man confront material and social conditions which, as legacies of the past, have come into being independent of his own will, but he is confronted by the presence of natural forces which operate in a way which he can never hope to alter. He furthermore finds himself inevitably bound to nature for the provision of his own survival. Thus man is confronted by the presence in his existence of a "kingdom of necessity". Marx has argued that it is the reality of his material needs and of his necessary dependence upon nature that is ultimately decisive in determining his thought and action.

But Marx gives expression throughout his works of the possibility open to man of extending the bounds of his freedom. While he emphasizes that men do not make their own life just as they please, and that they live under circumstances which they have not chosen themselves, Marx declared that "Men make their own history."⁵ Men are not merely acted upon and determined by the material

4. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1950, p. 293ff.

5. Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Ed. Lewis S. Feuer, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1959, p. 320.

and social forces in which they find themselves; the economic situation does not simply have an automatic effect on man. On the contrary, man himself acts upon these conditions and may exert a change upon them and upon the quality of his own life. "The material doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change circumstances and that the educator himself needs educating."⁶ It is not only life that determines man's consciousness, but his consciousness that determines his life. In this process both theory and practice, thought and experience are vital to change. Marx was concerned to deny that the conditions of life could be changed by ideas alone, but that essential to such change was the intervention of men in terms of actual action. Nevertheless ideas and understanding are important. "...we must regard it as a real advance to have gained beforehand a consciousness of the limited character as well as of the goal of this historical movement - and a consciousness which reaches out beyond it."⁷

That Marx postulates both a realm of necessity and a realm of freedom is further revealed in a distinction

6. Ibid., p. 244.

7. Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p. 124.

which he observes between human life and animal life. It is true that the human and the animal possess in common certain biological needs that both are engaged in production of the means of their survival. But the animal is bound to nature and to production in a way which man is not. The animal produces only its immediate needs for itself and its young. "It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical needs...." Man is not bound to a particular instinct or pattern of behaviour for his survival; he is capable of utilizing widely differentiated means based upon both his experience and his reason. This is the basis for Marx's distinction that animals produce "one-sidely"^d, while humans produce "universally". But there is another distinction between human production and animal production. Man "... produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom." Thus man may produce more than what is necessary for survival; he may produce also aesthetic and moral values. He is not determined solely by his physical needs. The distinctions, then, which Marx has observed between the human and the animal point to the presence in human life of the "realm of freedom."⁸

Engel's in his elaboration of Marx's conception of freedom and necessity, denies that freedom is to be understood as a quest for independence from natural law.

8. Ibid., p. 75.

Man cannot remove himself from such necessity; the belief that man may do so is but an idle dream. Nor does the extension of man's freedom come to him automatically or in a haphazard way; the extension of freedom depends upon man's own thought and effort. Freedom consists in the ability of man to control himself and external nature. But in order to control and utilize nature to extend his freedom, man must understand it. Thus borrowing from Hegel, Marx and Engels conceive of freedom as the recognition of necessity. "Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him freedom is the appreciation of necessity. 'Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood.' Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends."⁹

There are all sorts of social and material conditions in man's environment which determine the quality of human life; but man can change some of the conditions and thus change his own nature. But in order to make those changes which will lead to the creation of his desired aims, man must understand the connections between himself and the material world, and between himself and his

9. Op. Cit., p. 279.

fellow men. It is in this sense of understanding necessity that Marx's bias toward scientific socialism may be interpreted.

Scientific socialism, for Marx, involves not only the analysis and comprehension of social and natural laws, but also involves its practical use in controlling the conditions of life in the interests of man. Marx's criticism of society as it had developed to his day was that man was subjected to uncontrolled forces which constituted limitations to his freedom to achieve the higher quality of life that was possible for him even to the extent of his failure to satisfy his material needs. Essential to his success in his quest for freedom is planning; and planning is an essential feature of a socialist society.

Socialism, for Marx, may be interpreted as the means, based on scientific understanding of society and on reasoned planning, of extending the bounds of human freedom. Engels has elaborated this view, relating socialism to social planning and control and also to Marx's conception of freedom and necessity. In a socialist society, "Man's own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. Only from ~~that~~ time will man himself, more and more

consciously, make his own history -- only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom."¹⁰

Since man is capable of making choices in the direction of his own life, for better or worse and affecting not only himself but all others, he is a moral creature. While Marx has not given a specific account of a moral theory, there is much in his writing which implies a moral bias. In the Communist Manifesto, for example, he makes a moral condemnation of capitalist exploitation. "In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."¹¹ Engels, however, has elaborated Marx's moral position. Marx accepted the values of the bourgeois revolution - liberty, equality and fraternity; in this Marx remained within the mainstream of the humanist movement. It was against the failure of the bourgeois, indeed, its inability, to extend these values to all. For the self-interest of the bourgeois is such that he strives to maintain a social system based on the freedom of the few to exploit others, and the exploited are free in so far as they are able to sell their labor as a market commodity, if they can. Engels

10. Ibid., p. 109.

11. Ibid., p. 10.

contends that further moral progress is to be achieved by the extension of liberty, equality and fraternity to all, and not to one class rather than another. And it is the proletarians who seek the extension of these values. "The proletarians took the bourgeoisie at their word; equality must not be merely apparent, but must be extended to the social and economic spheres."¹² If there exist social and economic conditions which deprive masses of people of the humanist values, these values can be said to be merely formal and not real.

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."¹³ But this change, for Marx, will not come about merely because men wish them to - wishing does not make it so. For this reason Marx allows for the importance of political activity and organization based on an understanding of the needs of people, on social process, and on the political and economic means of achieving freedom, equality and fraternity. The leadership of the masses of the people toward these desired goals is vested in the communist.

"The communists are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly

12. Ibid., pp. 277.

13. Ibid., p. 245.

understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the general results of the proletarian movement."¹⁴

Men, by the acquisition of knowledge of society, by their organization of social production, and by their political struggles and moral persuasion are able to extend the bounds of their freedom and improve the quality of human life. It is thus that Marx reflects his acceptance of the existence in the world of both freedom and necessity.

It has been noted that Marx and Engels contended that a fundamental prerequisite to the acquisition of human freedom, to man's mastery of himself and of nature, was the understanding of laws of necessity. Borrowing from the "dialectics" of Hegel, they elaborated a philosophy of "dialectical materialism" which, to them, was the basis for the correct scientific understanding of natural and social phenomena. It is materialist in that it finds explanation of all phenomena in the material world, rather than in terms of a supernatural world or in the development of ideas. It is in this connection that Marx's dialectics differs from Hegel's, for Hegel saw change arising from the motion of Idea in which the social world, including the behaviour of nations, seeks to conform to this Idea. Marx rejected as determining any such form of idealist philosophy; matter is prior to mind or idea and is the determining factor in all phenomena in the world.

14. Ibid., p. 20.

Marx accepted the doctrine that everything is in a process of change or transformation. His dialectics is an explanation of the interconnection between things and of change. In its most general formulation, dialectics sees change as occurring from the presence of contradictions, of opposing forces, which are the basis of the laws of motion which are inexorable and absolute. In order to understand nature, it is necessary to understand the contradictions which are contending in nature, for change and process, which is a necessary characteristic of all phenomena, arises from these conflicts. Thus dialectical materialism represents the basis of understanding of the laws of material necessity.

The principles of dialectical materialism are applicable not only to the material world but to human society as well. Human society, too, must be understood in terms of discernable laws of motion and of the presence of contradictions which are as inexorable as natural law. In Marx's terms these laws of social development operate with "iron necessity towards inevitable results." Basing his analysis of social development on a materialist conception of reality, Marx finds that social change and phenomena is to be understood by an understanding of the economic base of society. Thus the major task of Marx was the elaboration of a theory of "economic determinism", employing the dialectical concept of contradiction. In his analysis of capitalist society, Marx observes the presence of contradiction. The advent of the bourgeois

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revolution was characterized by the socialization of the means of production. No longer was the means of production carried out by simple co-operation and manufacture and of individual handicrafts, but by the concentration of production in great workshops in which industry was carried out, not individually, but socially. But in contradiction to this transformation was the appropriation of social production, of the means of production, by the individual capitalist, that is the continuation of private property. Production is social, but ownership is private and individual. This contradiction in capitalist economic organization is reflected in the conflict between the main contending classes which it has created: between the proletariat and the capitalist.

In Marx's economic determinism, the economic base of society, including the forces of production such as the raw materials, the factories and machinery, and labor, and also the relations of production, the class organization of production, is the determining factor of all social phenomena, For according to Marx, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness."¹⁵ The economic base, the mode of production of material life, determines the ideology, the laws, governments, arts, sciences, religions and philosophies - the general character of social, political, and spiritual life of man. This superstructure is based upon man's

15. Ibid., p. 43.

economic life, and reflects the working out of the inexorable laws of dialectics. Both man's thought and action are determined by the dialectical laws of material and social development. Thus in his economic determinism, Marx places all of man's social, economic life in the "kingdom of necessity".

The placing of man's political activities within the "kingdom of necessity" has important consequences. For while men do act politically, whatever such actions may be, they cannot alter the ultimate tendency of social developments. The transformation of capitalist society, for example, as well as the ideology and class antagonism which it produces, arises from the very nature of material contradiction inherent in the system. And it is these contradictions which contain the seeds of its own destruction and of the transformation of capitalism to socialism. In dialectical terms, "..... capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of nature its own negation." Socialism is inevitable: this is an inexorable law of necessity operating independently of men's wills.¹⁶

A further consequence of Marx's economic determinism is revealed in his concept of the moral life of society. Morality is a part of the superstructure and as such is determined by the economic base and the laws which govern it. Morality is class morality, that is, a set of principles which act as the justification for the

16. Ibid., p. 166.

domination and the interests of the ruling class. The transformation of capitalism and socialism, as it constitutes the abolition of class division, will reflect a transformation of morality. There is in this concept of morality the implication which differentiates it from the traditional concept of morality as being derived from the presence of free will in society. In the traditional sense the individual, if his belief, thoughts, and actions are determined by "iron" laws of necessity, cannot be held morally accountable. Such phenomena in capitalist society as physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of overwork, all in the interests of private profit, do not depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. "Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist."¹⁷ Man's moral life belongs in the "kingdom of necessity."

In the preceding exposition of Marxist social theory there appear two irreconcilable views of the nature of the social world and of man's position in it. This irreconcilability arises from the acceptance of two contradictory philosophic positions: on the one hand, the view that the nature of the social world is characterized by the presence in it of both Freedom and Necessity, and on the other hand, and contradictory to this view, the belief that social phenomena operates in the realm of Necessity. It is the argument of this thesis that this philosophic contradiction

17. Ibid., p. 152.

is the root of difficulties which have appeared in the current formulation of Marxist social theory, involving some of the main tenets of Marxist doctrine. Some of these tenets will be examined in the light of their logical coherence to a social theory which is based on contradictory philosophic presuppositions.

It is intended that this examination will reveal significant consequences for the theory and practice of socialism. Since socialism represents both a body of theory and a program of action having a bearing on the practice of men in their practical affairs, the acceptance of one or the other of its philosophic presuppositions may be decisive in the shaping of man's destiny.

Chapter II

The Role of The Individual

Marx in his theory of economic determinism asserts an interconnection between the economic base and the superstructure of society: the superstructure does act upon the economic base. Nevertheless Marx was concerned to demonstrate the ultimate decisive nature of the economic base, the forces of production, in determining social development. This view is exemplified in his conception of the role of the individual in influencing historical development. Plekhanov, in his classic exposition of Marx's view, The Role of the Individual in History,¹⁸ rejects on the one hand a mechanistic view of determinism - the view that individuals play no part in shaping historical development, but rather are swept along helplessly in the tides of historical events. Plekhanov asserts that individual will and personality are themselves factors in social development; to remove the activities of individuals, or groups of individuals, would be to deny the reality of the concrete laws of social development and thus mar our understanding. The interaction between the economic base and the superstructure operates both ways, and the formulation of concrete laws of social development must take into account this interconnection. Plekhanov also rejects the view that exceptional and heroic individuals

18. Plekhanov, G. V., The Role of the Individual in History, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

(usually in contrast to the masses or collective will) shape the course of human destiny. In order to understand the influence of the superstructure on the base, and upon social development in general, the clue is to be found not in the interconnection between any particular individual and the economic base, but rather in the activities of the masses. But having expressed this concept of interconnection, Plekhanov, like Marx, emphasizes the decisive nature of the economic base. In accordance with Marx's theory of economic determinism, there are operating in the economic organization of society inexorable laws of development. Plekhanov stresses Marx's concept of the "inevitability of socialism". "The socialist believes," Plekhanov asserts, "that within the development of capitalist society itself, there are the germs of the new social system which will supplant it."¹⁹ The laws of social development are such that whatever may be the interconnection between the superstructure and the economic base, whatever may be the actions and ideologies of men, society will develop inexorably toward socialism.

Plekhanov gives an historical example of the phenomena of historical "accident" and of the role of individual will operating in history. The influence of Marquise de Pompadour and of Louis XV could not have been what it was except by virtue of the conditions in which they found themselves and which made it possible for them to act as they did. With reference to Madame Pompadour,

19. Ibid.

Plekhanov notes that she "....did not yield to public opinion. Why did she not yield? Probably because French society of that day had no means of compelling her to do so. But why was French society of that day unable to do so? It was prevented from doing so by its form of organization, which in turn, was determined by the relation of social forces in France at that time."²⁰

According to Plekhanov, the "great" individual exerts his personality within a framework of social forces which he cannot change but which he can exploit to further or retard those forces. Louis XV, Napoleon, and Stalin, according to this view, may be understood merely as personalities engaged in struggle against other personalities, and by the sheer force of their own characters shaping historical development, but as individuals who appreciated the most powerful trends and could conduct themselves in accordance with these trends. The "great" individual is a reflection of the needs of society arising from a multitude of conditions. He does not come into existence merely by his own free will or merely because he is "great". Plekhanov argues that at a particular stage of French social development there was a need for a Bonaparte; otherwise he could not have assumed the role that he did, certainly not by exerting his own personal qualities. And such was the need that if Bonaparte had not succeeded, the need would have been fulfilled by someone else. But whatever the opportunities open for other individuals, they cannot change the

20. Ibid.

general trends of historical development. No individual can, for example, alter the general trend of society in its movement toward socialism.

Plekhanov further illustrates that it is the social conditions of the time which give rise to "great" individuals. In France at the end of the 18th century a number of actors, lawyers, peddlers, and fencing masters emerged as outstanding military geniuses. Their latent gift for military strategy, which in some other society would have remained dormant, were given an opportunity to develop because of the social conditions in which they found themselves. Plekhanov also cited Taines' observation of the flourishing of dramatic art in the Elizabethan era: during this period dramatic art saw the emergence of Shakespeare, Beaumont, Fletcher, Jonson, Webster, Massinger, Ford, Middleton and Heywood. The conditions were ripe for their fulfillment. Plekhanov concludes, then, that "...they (talented individuals) are themselves the product of this (general trend); were it not for that trend they would never have crossed the threshold that divides the potential from the real." And in Marxism general trends are to be understood as occurring in accordance with laws of social development which find their source of motivation in the economic life of man.

In recent times the problem of assessing the role of the individual in history has been revealed in Khrushchev's secret speech on the "Cult of the Individual" delivered to

the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956.²¹ Khrushchev's criticism of the "cult of the individual" involved an attack upon some of the activities of Stalin. Stalin's absolute despotism is revealed, along with the practices of annihilation oppression, and deportation of innocent people, including "comrades", which took place under Stalin's rule. This document also claims that the concentration of power in the hands of Stalin, who had a strong sense of his own omniscience and omnipotence, cost the Soviet Union in World War II "...much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offense." Stalin, because of his egotism, had assumed a military role which neither he, nor any other individual, could possibly cope with. And Stalin's defects were obscured in the public mind by his elevation as a "hero".

What is of considerable interest in the Khrushchev speech are the references made to the methods whereby Stalin himself gained such enormous powers. One of the most important factors in Stalin's power was the implementation of "the cult of the individual." Stalin's power, his own belief in his abilities, the confidence which he had in his deeds, was woven into an image which had no rational basis in reality. Stalin could not possibly have undertaken the enormous tasks which he had

21. The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism:
A selection of documents, Ed. Russian Institute
Columbia University, Columbia U. Press, New York,
1956, pp. 1-89.

gathered into his care. It is significant to note Khrushchev's analysis of how Stalin himself nurtured the myth of the "cult of personality". "The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person." In explaining the increase in mass repressions after the XVIIIth Party Congress, Khrushchev charges that Stalin "had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party."

How was it possible for Stalin to assume such enormous power, such as to transcend the Communist Party in the Soviet Union? According to Khrushchev, Stalin was able to do this in part at least by the creation not only of the image of himself as a "hero," but by the creation of the concept of the "enemy of the people" to attack his critics. Thus, according to Khrushchev Stalin "actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's view known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character." There is in this analysis indication of the significance of ideology and of the use to which ideas may be utilized in determining political phenomena. This is further revealed in the proposal which Khrushchev offers for

the prevention of such events. What must be done, according to the speech, is to "abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw proper conclusions concerning both ideological, theoretical, and practical work." And to prevent any future possible abuse of the power of individuals. Khrushchev calls for a restoration of socialist democracy. For it was clear that Stalin had militated against what could be properly conceived of as "socialist democracy".

The publication of these revelations resulted in a sharp reaction throughout the world. Many of the exposures confirmed what critics of Soviet political affairs had all along contended, and which had been denied by Marxists. So great was the moral shock of these facts that many of them defected from the various communist parties. Other socialists imbued by Marxist interpretations of historical development found themselves confronted by theoretical difficulties in reconciling Khrushchev's analysis to Marx's theory of economic determinism of historical process. To meet these criticisms a subsequent report was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.²² This document emphasized, in accordance with the views which we have observed in Plekhanov, the determining factor of general social conditions which made it possible for Stalin to gain such absolute powers; these

22. Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

conditions were brought about, for one thing, by the presence of enemies from without, that is in foreign countries, which required security measures within, measures which could not under these circumstances be "democratic". And, of course, there still were remnants of bourgeois reactionaries in the Soviet Union who would welcome a subversion of the Soviet socialist State. And reminiscent of Plekhanov, the Committee report asserts: "To think that any individual, even so great a one as Stalin could change our social and political system is to go completely against the facts, against Marxism and truth, to lapse into idealism. It would mean attributing to an individual such abnormal and supernatural forces of ability to change the system of society, especially of a social system where the decisive force lies in the millions-strong masses of the working people. As is known, the nature of a social and political system is determined by the mode of production, by ownership of the means of production, by the class which holds the political powers."

It would appear that the application of a strict doctrine of "economic determinism" confronts serious difficulties in explaining the role of the individual in historical experience. Sydney Hook, in his criticism of Marx's historical materialism observes that this theory is inadequate to explain the influence of such men

as Lenin. Historical materialism he states, "cannot account for the fact that an event-making person like Lenin had a far greater causal influence on the Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917 in Russia than the state of the forces of production or the degree of development of the relations of production."²³ The account given by the Committee invites a similar criticism -- for the report attributes Stalin's activities on the basis of the social conditions, whereas Khrushchev had gone beyond explaining Stalin on a basis of this materialist doctrine. The report of the Central Committee has attempted to retain a determinist position by appeal to the concept of the "depth" of social conditions in which Stalin lived: Stalin did not change, nor could he have changed, the socialist base, the socialist economic structure of the Soviet Union. This view conforms to Plekhanov's contention that the effectiveness of human action is dependent on the "depth" of social trends; if the removal of an individual from the historical scene results in a change in social trend, then, we may judge, that the trend had been too "shallow". There are certain factors in the account of Stalin's activities which are not given adequate treatment to account for its support of a theory of "depth". For it gives no indication of

23. Hook, Sidney, Marx and the Marxists. The Ambiguous Legacy, D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, N.J., 1955, p. 37.

the extent of the effort which Stalin directed to changing the basic socialist economic structure of the Soviet Union. The possibility remains a matter of conjecture that the economic socialist structure did not alter any more than it did, because Stalin did not try to change it. And even if he could not have changed it, this does not entail that he could not have tried. Whatever the case may be, it is not clear in what way the political system of the Soviet Union is "determined by the mode of production" as it developed in the Stalin era. The reports do not explain the political trends during this period to changes in the mode of production. For if this argument that human actions, including their political activities, are determined by the mode of production by the ownership of the means of production, and by the class which holds the political power, is to be held, then it must follow that Stalin's excesses and the political developments of the Stalin period in the Soviet Union were reflections of conditions in the socialist economic base. Why, it might be asked, was the working class not in power in a socialist country?

Khrushchev's speech is much concerned to direct an attack upon what it described as the "cult of personality", a factor which it attaches to the field of ideology, that is to say, to what Marx had considered to belong to the "superstructure" of society. The importance and influence of an idea and its use is emphasized. The use that Stalin himself made of an

ideology, and a false one in the view of the speech, contributed to his tyrannical power. Furthermore, the speech enjoins people to give active resistance to such thinking and to such ideas as expressed in the "cult of personality". The assumption is that people are able, by choice or persuasion, to give thought to an idea which is independent of the particular stage of development, to an idea which is not a product of the socialist stage of economic development. Besides if people's thoughts were strictly determined, then it would not make sense to ask them to think in any other way.

There is a further element in the discussion of the Stalin excesses which introduces difficulty in maintaining a strict determinist view of social phenomena. For the reports assign to Stalin a measure of moral responsibility: he is held accountable for various crimes. In this case to^o moral censure of Stalin would not make sense if his actions were determined by the mode of production, if he could not have acted otherwise. The implication of the moral censure of Stalin is that he could have acted otherwise, that moral choice was available to him.

There appeared in both the Khrushchev speech and in the report of the Central Committee a recognition of the dissociation of an idea, the cult of the individual, and the ideological use made of the idea of "the enemy of the people" from the socialist economic base. Also indicated was the importance of such ideas, and of mass resistance to them by the masses and the Communist Party,

in securing democratic socialism. And finally there appeared the assumption of personal moral responsibility. All of these give indication of the presence in social development of human freedom. Yet the reports maintain the view that the social and political system are "determined by the mode of production". There exists therefore in the Marxist theory of the role of the individual as it has been expressed regarding Stalin a contradiction between two conflicting philosophic positions; the view, on the one hand, that social life is characterized by both freedom and necessity, and the view, on the other hand that social life operates according to necessity.

Chapter III

The Theory of Classes

It has been noted that in an attempt to explain social development, Marx applied his theory of dialectical materialism according to which social development occurs as a result of contradiction in the economic system of society. This contradiction is reflected in the creation and conflict of social classes. Marx interprets classes in terms of their relationship to the means of production; in capitalist society there are three main classes: the capitalist class who are the owners of the means of production as well as of finance capital, the working class or proletariat who depend for their livelihood solely on the hire of their labor, and a third class composed of those of ambivalent circumstances such as lawyers, doctors, small businessmen, people who are not readily classifiable either as capitalist or proletariat. Regarding this latter class, Marx envisioned that increased expropriation by the capitalist class would result in the decline of the 'middle class' and the increase of the ranks of the proletariat. The increase in the polarization of the two main contending classes - the capitalist and the proletariat - would be reflected in intensification of class conflict. People enter into these class relations independent of their own will, and once having entered find themselves subject to imminent laws of capitalist production. "Free competition brings out the inherent of capitalist production, in the shape

of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist."²⁴

In an economic system in which production must serve the interests of private profit, social labour, which has an immense productive potentiality for serving the interests of all mankind, is fettered. But the consequences of the class division are not economic alone. For Marx, in his elaboration of economic determinism, draws a relationship between the class structure of the economic base and its reflection in the superstructure. There exists in the superstructure class ideologies including class morality - which themselves are in conflict and reveal the basic contradictions of the capitalist system.

Since Marx's time several developments have taken place which have merited considerable discussion of the class theory, and which have in some respects left the theory open to important criticisms. In Marxist literature much stress had been placed on the role of the factory or industrial worker as best representing the proletariat; and it was expected that through this proletariat in conflict with the capitalist ruling class that a socialist society would be brought about. Yet in the twentieth century, socialist revolutions have occurred principally in countries that were primarily agricultural, in which in Marx's classification the chief classes were the peasants and landlords. In both

24. Feuer, p. 152.

the U.S.S.R. and in China there still existed a strong feudal base and neither were industrially advanced nations with a dominant industrial proletariat. Another of Marx's predictions which has been brought into question is his concept of the "increased polarization" of the classes. Critics have observed that in advanced capitalist societies there has been a substantial increase in the size and influence of the 'middle' class. It is further argued that this middle class has developed interests of its own, different from those of either the proletariat or the capitalist. And within this 'middle class' there has emerged a 'managerial class' which has gained a control of economic decision-making so great that the capitalist class no longer has the significance which Marx had attributed to it. Some critics argue that the old, traditional, direct confrontation of worker and owner, which Marx had observed in his time, has altered. Managers, rather than capitalist owners, make decisions regarding production; and they are no longer dictated by the need to make decisions on a basis of profit-making alone. They are, in fact, tempered in their decisions by pressures of all sorts - by labor organizations, consumer demands, and by governmental regulation. C.A.R. Crosland attaches considerable significance to these trends in his criticism of the Marxist diagram. "The economic power of the capital market and the finance houses, and hence capitalist financial control over industry (in the strict sense of the word) are thus much weaker. This

change alone makes it rather absurd to speak now of a capitalist ruling class."²⁵ Such books as William H. Whyte, Jr.'s The Organization Man, Mills' The Power Elite, and Packard's The Status Seekers give evidence of the complexity of class divisions and of class power not readily explainable by a concept of the increasing polarization of classes or of a theory which explains power in terms of two classes - the proletariat and the capitalist. Something of this difficulty is to be observed with respect to the idea of "class consciousness; in Marx's theory "class consciousness" is determined by the economic "relations of production", by the presence in a capitalist society of a contradiction between the socialization of production and private ownership.

Howard Selsam, accepting Marx's economic determinism including his class theory, attempts to explain the morality of the 'middle class'. He attributes to this class a morality which is the expression of traditional bourgeois individualism. "Having no class of their own in the sense of belonging to a definite group with a fixed relationship to the instruments of production, they sympathize with one or the other of the two great classes and tend to identify themselves with either the workers or the capitalists..."²⁶ On the one hand Selsam

attributes to the middle class a morality of its own, and

25. Crosland, C.A.R., The Future of Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1956, p. 510.

26. Selsam, Howard, Socialism and Ethics, International Publishers, New York, 1943.

on the other hand suggests that they choose the morality of one or the other of two different classes. But there is a further, perhaps more crucial difficulty; for it would appear that the middle class, not bound by any fixed relationship to the means of production, is free to choose moralities. It would appear that the middle class is not determined in the same way that Marx had ascribed to either the proletariat or the capitalist class; it has a freedom of choice which neither of the other classes has. The middle class has a foot in the "Kingdom of Freedom".

The difficulty of classifying the class affiliation or the presence of class consciousness is not restricted to the middle class. Who properly belong to the proletariat? A recent survey conducted by various socialist organizations has attempted to answer this question. The editors of the World Marxist Review explain some of the difficulties encountered in the survey of classifying the content of the proletariat.²⁷ The editorial article accepts the principles of Marx's theory of class and Engels' definition of the proletariat as "the class of modern wage-laborers who having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live." Yet the survey and the commentary would indicate that this definition alone is

27. "What are the Changes in the Structure of the Working Class?", ed. Editorial Board, World Marxist Review, Progress Books, Toronto, Vol. 3., No. 5., May 1960, p.p. 37-56.

inadequate to classify workers. For according to the editorial article there are difficulties in assessing the class affiliation of some workers, not simply because of an ambiguous relationship to the means of production or because they do not sell their labor-power, but because of the level of their "class consciousness".

Some workers are ideologically and politically backward and the reactionaries use them in their struggle against the progressive forces. The implication of this is that "class consciousness", ideological and political, that phenomena which Marx had placed in his "superstructure", becomes the determining factor in estimating class content. A worker who may belong to the proletariat from an economic point of view, because of his membership in a class which sells its labor-power, may not be deemed a proletarian because of his moral and ideological affiliation with another class.

The distinction between class membership and class affiliation is further emphasized in the article by a discussion of the existence in some countries of what has been described as an "aristocracy of labor". The survey of the U.S. Labor Research Association, workers of the construction industry - plumbers, carpenters, electricians, structural iron workers, and so on - have been classified as belonging to such an "aristocracy". They enjoy a privileged economic position among workers which impels them to side with the bourgeois. According to the article, this "aristocracy of labor" is characterized

by its opportunism, collaboration, and acceptance of the ideology and politics of the bourgeois. Thus the "labor aristocracy" adopts its ideological and political position not as a result of its class membership as sellers of labor, but because of its privileged economic status. The introduction of "class consciousness" as a factor in determining the political activity of workers suggests the importance of ideology and belief in class structure. It is not class membership which is the criteria for classifying the proletariat, but class affiliation or ideology.

How important is "class consciousness" to the advancement of socialist aspirations? The editors of the World Marxist Review offer an answer to this important question. "The complex composition of the working class is one of the reasons why guidance of the working masses by the revolutionary vanguard - and the Marxist -Leninist parties - is essential. If we were to wait until all sections of the proletariat became conscious of the status and class aims of their own volition, we could have to wait until doomsday."²⁸ Until doomsday for what? Socialism? But socialism is, according to Marx's deterministic theory a necessary, inevitable outcome of capitalist society. Yet it would appear that political struggle, the active awakening of class consciousness, is essential to the advent of socialism. Without such activity, as is suggested by this statement,

28. Ibid., p. 52.

socialism might not be brought about it all. There is therefore indication of a view which is contradictory to an explanation of social development on a basis of the theory of economic determinism. For the acceptance of the significance of human will as a determining factor in social development implies the presence of what Marx referred to as the "Kingdom of Freedom".

Chapter IV

The Theory of the State

Marx's theory of the State is an important aspect of his theory of economic determinism; for the State is a reflection of the relations of production, of the class structure of society. In past history each society has been characterized by class antagonisms - between the oppressed and the oppressors - in which the ruling class, in order to protect its own interests and domination, requires an instrument with which to maintain rule and to check excess of class conflict which could disrupt social organization. This instrument may assume a variety of forms, both political and legal, under differing conditions and levels of civilization; but in whatever form it may appear its function is the same - to rule. It is this instrument which Marx called the State. And in his concept of the economic base-superstructure organization of society, the State properly belongs to the superstructure.

The composition of the State is varied and complex; it includes legal institutions and administrators, the laws and the police, the government and its members, the armies and their weapons. All are instruments of class rule. In Lenin's exposition of the theory of the state, parliamentary governments too are a part of the State - they are instruments of class rule. Lenin particularly emphasized the function of the State to exercise compulsion

over the ruled, the majority of society. In this capacity, the chief means of state power is, therefore, a standing army and police. This viewpoint of the State has important consequences upon the tactics of the proletariat in its political struggle. How is the State of the ruling class to be overcome? Lenin, denying that the ruling class would voluntarily relinquish the State and its powers, even where parliamentary governments exist, believed that only force would be effective in wresting power. "The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without violent revolution."

29 There are two senses in which violent revolution becomes, for Lenin, inevitable; in the sense that by no other means can the State of the capitalist ruling class be overcome, and in the sense that socialism is inevitable as a law of social development, and therefore, violent revolution itself is a necessary, inevitable stage in the transformation of capitalism to socialism.

By what force, then, is the revolution to be carried out? In answer to this, Lenin accepts Engels' concept of what he termed a "self-acting armed organization of the proletariat." It is this army, an army of the oppressed classes, which would wage a war of violent revolution to crush and to abolish the Capitalist State.

After the revolution, after the overthrow of the

29. Lenin, V.I., "The State and Revolution", Selected Works in Two Volumes, V.II, part I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952, p. 220.

capitalist State, what will replace the capitalist State? It has been noted that the State, in Marxian theory, is a product of class antagonism and is the instrument of the dominant class of any given society. But in a socialist society, in which the contradiction between the socialization of production and private ownership has been removed, there will no longer exist the basic class conflict. For in a socialist society the masses of the people are the owners of the means of production; there is no capitalist class. Thus in a socialist society the State, since its function as a coercive instrument of one class against another is no longer needed, will as Engels has described the process, "wither away".

But Lenin is concerned to point out that it is not the bourgeois State which will 'wither away'; the bourgeois State which will be crushed and abolished by means of violent revolution. It is the proletariat State which will 'wither away'. For, drawing from a concept of Marx, Lenin elaborated on a period of socialist development which is characterized by "the dictatorship of the proletariat". In order to protect the new socialist economic organization against remnants of the capitalist State and allied reactionary forces both within and from without the new socialist country, there would be a time in which the proletariat would require its own instrument of compulsion, a State of its own. This State would "wither away" as the remaining obstacles and threats of bourgeois political and ideological activity disappeared. A classless, Stateless socialist society

would then come into being; but in the meantime, it is inevitable that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and its State will come into being also.

There appear in Lenin's exposition of the theory of the State several factors which point to the decisive nature of political struggle in achieving a socialist society. One such is that which attributes crucial significance to the "self-regulating armed organization of the population". How, one might ask, is this army to secure the power, the military means, with which to oppose the established capitalist State? No doubt, one of the activities of the ruling State would be to ensure itself against the possibility of effective revolutionary power falling into the hands of the oppressed classes - that, at any rate, would appear to be one of its functions. And the fact that an oppressed worker is exploited in a mine or a factory, or that he has a particular relationship to the means of production, does not give an adequate explanation of how he and his fellows secure military power; class membership is not enough. Whatever its tactics may be the proletariat must engage in some sort of political organization and activity in order to acquire revolutionary power. The acquisition of power, then, does not come automatically from the creation in the economy of class division. Indeed, in Lenin's exposition, political action and persuasion become a salient feature of the transformation of capitalism to socialism. Lenin expresses awareness of the importance

of class consciousness of the revolutionary role of the proletariat, and explains its weakness among some workers as a result of ideological deception: many are blind to the real nature of parliamentary governments and the falsity of the slogans of democracy as part of the class instrument of rule. Universal suffrage, for example, Lenin declares to be a deception practiced by the bourgeois. He attacks 'petty bourgeois democrats' because "they instil into the minds of the people the false notion that universal suffrage in the modern state is really capable of ascertaining the will of the majority of the toilers and of securing its realization."³⁰ Lenin was concerned to make quite clear the importance of the struggle for men's minds, the ideological struggle; "The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with this and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of all the teachings of Marx and Engels." But why imbue people with an idea that is inevitably to come? There is the suggestion in Lenin's polemics that neither socialism nor the required revolutionary spirit comes about inevitably from a particular stage of economic development alone. This suggestion Lenin makes even clearer in his exposition of Marx's analysis of the successes and failures of the Paris Commune, which had many of the characteristics of a proletarian uprising. Lenin attributes at least a part of the failure of the Paris Commune to an inadequacy in its political tactics. "It is

30. Ibid.,

still necessary... to suppress the bourgeoisie and crush its resistance. This was particularly necessary for the Commune and one of the reasons for its defeat was that it did not do this with sufficient determination."³¹ In short, Lenin attributes something of the failure of the Commune to a failure in men's wills; men could have exercised more determination.

Revolution, according to Lenin, is inevitable, but is the triumph of the oppressed classes inevitable? The lesson of the Paris Commune would indicate that a factor in the success or failure of revolutionary activities is the extent of political organization and of political determination. But the success or failure of revolution is crucial to Marx's theory of economic determinism. The Communist Manifesto states that its study of history "compels us to regard the state as the organ of class rule and leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the proletariat without first capturing political power, without attaining political supremacy, without transforming the state into the 'proletariat' organized as the ruling class."³² But, in Lenin's polemics, it seems clear that the victory of the proletariat is not to come about of its own accord; victory against the ruling State, and hence socialism itself, is dependent at least to a significant degree, upon political struggle - ideological, tactical, military - and the success of this struggle may depend upon the determination or the wills

31. Ibid., p. 242.

32. Ibid., p. 227.

of men. It would appear to result from this that socialism is not inevitable as a necessary law of social development, independent of men's wills. Marx's and Lenin's political polemics in this respect, which allows for the decisive nature of political struggle, is in contradiction to Marx's theory of economic determinism.

Recent events in the Soviet Union, revealed in the Khrushchev exposure of the Stalin excesses, have brought into question the nature of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". For Marx and Lenin, "the dictatorship" and the proletarian state were regarded as a necessary defence against the threat of bourgeois counter-revolutionary activity. Both regarded this period as a major advance toward genuine democracy. "The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transitions to Communism, "stated Lenin, will for the first time create democracy for the people, for the majority, along with the necessary suppression of the minority - the exploiters." But the Khrushchev exposures of Stalin's regime have pointed to a serious defect in this view. For the revelations indicate that the proletarian state, in the period of the "dictatorship of the Soviet Union", became an instrument of rule not only against the bourgeois exploiters and reactionary forces but against elements of the proletariat, including Khrushchev himself and many of his comrades who were sympathetic to Soviet socialism. Just as Lenin had charged that the bourgeois State had risen "above society", so the Khrushchev report charges

that Stalin's State had risen above Soviet socialist society, above the proletariat, and the Communist Party itself. The proletariat and many of its leaders had, during a period of the Stalinist regime, no effective, deomocratic control of their State. It has become apparent that the nature of the proletarian State, whether it is to be demomratically controlled or whether it is to maintain its proper function as a protector of the interests of the proletariat, is not dependent solely on the nature of the economic base. It is apparent that it is not a necessary law of social development that a socialist economic organization will bring about that advance toward democracy which Marx had envisioned as an inevitable outcome of the socialist economic organization.

The theory of the State, particularly as elaborated by Lenin, in the emphasis it gives to political struggle and leadership, to the importance of ideological, polemical struggle, to the level of class consciousness of the proletariat points to the significance of the appeal that must be made to the wills of men. The wills of men may be a decisive factor in bringing about a socialist state and in determining the quality of that state in terms of its democratic content. This aspect of Marxism-Leninism and the actual social development in the Soviet Union as revealed in the Khrushchev revelations contradict a purely determinist doctrine which interprets social change in terms of change in the economic organization of society.

It has been noted that Lenin regarded any form of government - whether a monarchy or a republic, an aristocracy or a democracy - to be a part of the State ruling apparatus in any class society. The form of Government, its techniques and institutions, its legislative functions and its laws become instruments whereby the dominant class in a society, the ruling class, protects and maintains its interest through its coercive power. Lenin was particularly concerned to attack the claims made, particularly by Social Democrats, for bourgeois parliamentary governments; for him such governments were ruling class instruments. He denied that parliamentary governments in capitalist societies were democratic the capitalist class would never allow its own destruction through parliamentary means and would, in fact, in the face of a serious threat to their power, curtail or bypass parliamentary procedures to protect its own interests. It followed from this, in Lenin's view, that only violent revolution could be effective in bringing about a socialist society; indeed, because of the unwillingness of the capitalist class to relinquish its power and the futility of parliamentary governments in wresting power from the ruling class, violent revolution is inevitable. Lenin, in his polemics, did not attack Social Democrats simply because he believed them to be mistaken about parliamentary governments, but also because their acceptance of such governments militated against what Lenin regarded to be the only means of achieving socialism - which required

the growth of the consciousness of the proletariat of its revolutionary role. Thus, in this respect, Lenin attached considerable importance to the acceptance by the proletariat of what was for him the correct political spirit and tactics - revolution.

The controversy among socialists about the political means of achieving socialism continues to the present day. The Socialist International at Frankfurt in 1951 rejected Lenin's view. "Socialists strive to build a new society in freedom and by democratic means... Without freedom there can be no socialism. Socialism can be fully achieved only through democracy."³³ G. D. H. Cole, himself a Social Democrat, adopted a less rigid view. While he accepted the formula of the Socialist International as applicable to western nations, he denied that socialism in other countries must necessarily be brought about by democratic means. He argued that in backward areas of the world where there has developed neither advanced industry or a tradition of parliamentary government, where socialist advances may be obstructed by feudal or capitalist autocracies, violent revolution may be necessary.³⁴ A recent article by Erskine B. Childers lends support to Cole's argument; it gives evidence of some of the difficulties in transplanting western parliamentary forms of democracy to certain Afro-Asian countries such

33. Hook, P. 243.

34. Cole, G.D.H., World Socialism Restated, New London Statesman 1956, p. 7, Pamphlet.

as Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Childers attributes one of the difficulties of transplanting parliamentary techniques in these areas to the presence there of vast peasant populations who are politically ignorant of democratic procedures and habits, and who are illiterate.³⁵ But whatever the facts of regional conditions may be, there exists a conflict between the socialist who regards parliamentary means and the socialist who regards violent means the only road to socialism, and both are in conflict with another group which argues that the means of achieving socialism, whether violent or democratic, is dependent on a multitude of conditions including the extent of political preparedness and opportunity of the people.

Something of the controversy regarding the political means of achieving socialism finds its source in Marx's own concept of the development of democracy. His own aspirations were directed toward a democratic society; he expressed high regard for the moral and political values advanced by the French Revolution and the American Revolution of Independence; he accepted the basic principles of the bourgeois revolutions - freedom, equality, and brotherhood. In this respect, Marx was within the mainstream of humanist thought and tradition. Marx's conception of socialism was expressed in terms which reflect the humanist and democratic bias, revealed, for example, in his definition of socialism as an institution in which "the condition for the free

³⁵. Childers, Erskine B., "Where Democracy doesn't work... Yet.", Harpers Magazine, Vol. 220, No. 1319, April 1960.

development of each is the condition for the free development of all."³⁶

But Marx, struck by the glaring inequalities and strife, the poverty and enforced ignorance of the workers of 19th century industrialism sought to explain why the ethical pronouncements of the bourgeois humanist movement had not become a reality for all. He found his explanation in economic terms: in terms of the contradiction between the increasing socialization of production and private ownership, the accumulation of wealth in the hands of capitalist owners, and the increasing pauperization of the worker, the creation of labour as a market commodity, the exploitation of the worker, the creation of antagonistic class, and so on - all of which were factors of an economic system which made the extension of the humanist ideals to the masses of the people impossible of realization as long as capitalism existed.

Marx, in accordance with his economic theory, believed that full democracy was impossible in a capitalist society. Only in a socialist society could full democracy be achieved. For in the creation of socialist economic measures, in the social ownership of the means of production could real democracy be achieved; the democratic quality of the socialist society would follow necessarily from the very nature of the socialist economic organization. Thus in Marx's work the key to democracy the ^arealization of the humanist values, was to be found in

36. Feuer, p. 29.

the inevitable development of socialism.

Since Marx's time many critics have rejected Marx's belief that the introduction of socialist economic organization leads necessarily to the creation of a democratic society. Historical experience since Marx's time would confirm at least that belief which denies that democracy is a necessary, inevitable outcome of socialist economic organization. Developments which have occurred in the socialist countries give evidence of the political problems which arise where active political participation of the masses of the people are limited, where political power becomes highly centralized. Where control and planning of the entire economic structure of society is to be carried out problems of democratic political activity are great, and preoccupation with legal and political means of making democracy effective would appear to be essential in a socialist society. Whatever else may be the case, it is apparent that Marx's economic determinism does not give an adequate explanation of democracy.

Chapter V

The Theory of Imperialist War

"Large-scale war, war between great Powers has been the outcome of the concentration of wealth in the hands of finance-capital groups in each country. What is apparently a purely economic process - the concentration of production and of capital - leads straight to the terrible social calamity of war." Lenin's analysis of imperialist war is thus derived from Marx's economic theory. According to Lenin capitalists are drawn "against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transition~~d~~ one from complete free competition to complete socialization." This stage Lenin called monopoly capital. After territorial expansion of great nations had reached its limit, economic imperialism began to be characterized by the export, not only of goods, but of capital as well.³⁷ This process has led to the increasing concentration of wealth and power in the hands of finance-capital and is expressed in the growth of international monopolies and cartels. It is possible now for the representatives of finance-capital to sit on the boards of corporations of several countries. Thus participating in the exploitation of the world's wealth are a few great finance-monopoly groups. In this view, World War I and World War II were the outcome of efforts of imperialist powers to redivide the wealth of the world. There have been attempts by imperialist groups to divide world

37. Lenin, V.I., "Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism", Selected Works in Two Volumes, V.I.

markets by mutual agreement, but according to Lenin, such agreements are not likely to last. For one of the laws of social development is the unequal development of the capitalist nations. Hence, as the productiv^e powers of one nation increases, it would no longer be content with the earlier agreement for its share of the world markets.

There ~~e~~exist, in Lenin's theory, two main types of wars - those which are civil wars involving national liberation or socialist revolution against the ruling class, and imperialist wars, in which redivisions of the wealth of the world is conducted by forceful means. This classification has been recently maintained by the Editorial Department of the Chinese publication "Hongqui". "The struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism are two different kinds of struggle." In its discussion of the idea of 'peaceful co-existence', the editorial article states that 'peaceful co-existence', refers to international relations, and that revolutionary wars refer to the overthrow of oppressors within each country. Lenin's moral distinction is repeated: there are the "unjust" wars of imperialism, and the "just" wars of liberation and of the socialist revolution.³⁸

There are introduced into the "Hongqui" editorial several factors which are in contradiction to a strict economic analysis of war. For in its polemics against

38. The Editorial Department of the Hongqui, "Long Live Leninism," Long Live Leninism, Foreign Languages Press Peking, 1960., p.p. 1-56.

"criminal imperialist wars" and in its reference to "just" and "unjust" wars, there is a moral judgment that is contrary to the theory that both imperialist wars and revolutionary wars are inevitable, necessary products of economic conditions. In a strictly determinist position, capitalists are drawn into wars against their wills. The proletariat similarly is impelled to engage in revolution as an inevitable feature of the transition from capitalism to socialism. In an order of society in which war occurs independently of men's wills, it does not make sense to introduce moral judgment.

The "Hongqui" editorial also makes reference to the idea of "peaceful coexistence". Yet this policy has important consequences for the Marxist-Leninist analysis of war. For this idea is in contradiction to Lenin's assertion of the inevitability of imperialist wars as long as capitalism exists. Pierre Villon has recently written: "In laying bare the internal contradictions and laws of capitalism which engender war, Marx and Engels, and even more so Lenin, who further developed scientific socialism on the basis of his analysis of the imperialist phase, warned the working class against the illusion that war could be ended so long as capitalism reigned supreme in the world, because under capitalism wars are inevitable."³⁹ The introduction of the idea of "peaceful co-existence" has required some clarification of what is and what is not inevitable. There are several interpretations which may be

39. Villon, Paul. "War and the Working Class", World Marxist Review, Vol.3, No. 5. May 1960, p. 7.

offered: that wars among capitalist nations themselves are inevitable, but that wars between socialist nations and the capitalist nations are not; or that international wars of any sort are not inevitable, but that national wars of liberation and socialist revolutions are inevitable. Some recent Marxist statements would indicate that the latter view is at issue. R. Palme Dutt, for example, writing in a recent article in the World Marxist Review attributes changes in the international situation not to any basic change in the character of imperialism itself, but rather to the "new balance of world forces," through the increasing power of socialism in the world, and the weakening power of imperialist nations, and to the tremendous upsurge of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁴⁰ But there is in this view the implication that the inevitability of the imperialist powers to wage war is not determined solely by the basic economic nature of imperialist capitalism. Dutt has offered, as a determining condition, what is essentially a theory of the "balance of power." And in spite of his acceptance of Lenin's analysis Villon declared that in addition to the rise of proletarian internationalism as a deterrent to war, the "launching of the peace movement" has had an effect. As an example of the struggle for peace three ideas set forth by Lenin are presented: "to rip off the veil of secrecy with which the imperialists conceal their preparations for war, to bring home to the people the truth about war and alert

40. Dutt, R. Palme, "Lenin, Imperialism and Mr. Strachey". World Marxist Review, Vo.3, No.4, April 1960, p. 79.

their vigilance to organize the masses and help the peoples to intervene in the questions of war and peace by taking recourse to mass action, to force the rulers publicly to give account of their actions... to force the imperialists to recognize the need for co-existence between countries with differing economic and political systems, namely the need to co-exist with the socialist system."⁴¹ Thus, in this discussion, there is the suggestion that war between the socialist world and the capitalist world and the relationship between these two forces cannot be understood in terms of an economic determinist theory, that a decisive factor may be the determination, the will with which the masses oppose and expose war; the extent of the political activity of the ideological struggle, including the peace movements, may be a decisive factor.

The importance of the political struggle is further revealed by a "Hongqui" editorial which declares that "War is an inevitable outcome of systems of exploitation and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end wars of one kind or another will always occur." Yet in this very same editorial the inevitability of revolutionary war is linked to the political consciousness and organization of the proletariat. "Without the proletariat dictatorship, without its full mobilization of the working people on these fronts to wage unavoidable struggles, stubbornly and persistently, there can be no socialism, nor can there be any victory for socialism."

41. Villon, p. 4.

Thus so decisive is political activity, in this view, that the doctrine of the inevitability of socialism is a law of economic necessity is contradicted. The introduction of moral and political persuasion into the question of wars allows for the presence in social development of human will and free choice. This is in contradiction to a strict determinist view which attempts to the phenomena of war solely in the "Kingdom of Necessity".

Chapter VI

The Theory of Alienation

The relationship which Marx drew between economics and human thought and personality is revealed in his theory of "alienation". Marx had conceived of freedom in terms of man's struggle against material and social forces which restricted him in his 'self-creation', in his effort to fulfill himself as a human being, in giving fullest expression to his human potential. Marx's concept of the human struggle against alienation, which deprives man of his real powers, represents the moral basis of his socialism. In the interpretation of Rubel and Bottomore, Marx envisioned a "real transformation of society, whose moral aspect would be the re-acquisition by man of his natural qualities, a rehabilitation of himself as a social being liberated from enslaving alienations."⁴² Marx was aware that all sorts of factors, both material and social, philosophic, religious, and political could alienate man. Marx unified these alienations by applying to them his theory of economic determinism; alienations were basically a product of economics.

This connection is revealed in Marx's treatment of capitalism as a money system. For Marx "Money is the alienated ability of mankind". In a money system man is dehumanized; he is not what he is by virtue of his own individuality, but by the powers of money. In a society in which man's relationships are human, which is

42. Marx, Karl, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy ed. T.B. Bottomore and Maximilain Rubel, Watts and Co. London, p. 6.

based on his own individuality and growth, man's ability to influence other people depends on his own ability to stimulate and encourage, his ability to enjoy art depends on his own growth as an artistically cultivated person, his educational and vocational growth depends on his own talents. In a money system, according to Marx, the individual is alienated from such real powers, from a being unique in individuality. "That which is for me through the medium of money -- that for which I can pay (i.e. which money can buy) -- that am I, the possessor of money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money's properties are my properties and essential powers -- the properties and powers of its possessor. Thus what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality."⁴³ Something of Marx's meaning finds expression in present-day colloquial use in such expressions as "Money talks" or "It's not what you are; it's what you've got."

In recent literature, socialists have shown considerable interest and disagreement in Marx's theory of alienation. Eric Fromm sees man alienated by authoritarianism and by substitution of symbol for reality; E.P. Thompson stresses that man becomes "prisoners of ideas"; Cole, Strachey and Crosland have been concerned about the alienation of the masses of the people from exercising effective political expression. The controversy between such viewpoints as these and Marx's appears to be a matter of establishing

43. Marx, Manuscripts of 1844, p.p. 138-9

what is 'primary' or 'fundamental'; Marx's view argues the primacy of economic determinism - such alienations as authoritarianism, false ideas, political frustrations are products of the economic system.

The difficulty of maintaining Marx's determinism is evident when the Marxist-Leninist political polemics and the theory of the State are considered. It has been seen that in the theory of the State the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist State becomes a decisive, indeed an inevitable, factor in the transformation of capitalism to socialism. But how is this revolution to be carried out - by what power? If we are to apply Marx's analysis of money strictly, it would appear that, for the sake of logical consistency, we must assume that since the proletariat itself is bound by the money system (and in this respect it is to become increasingly pauperized) the accumulation of money gives to the ruling class its powers, including control of the State, then the proletariat, too, must suffer the consequences of the depreciation of its own accumulation of money wealth. If money is power, then the proletariat will decline in power. Or even if the notion of pauperization is abandoned, then the proletariat must buy power.

But Lenin, particularly, saw that the power of the State whether it represented the power of the few of the ruling class as compared with the power of the many of the proletariat was formidable. And in his polemics, Lenin

does not rely, if he mentions it at all, on money as the key to the increasing power of the proletariat in its revolutionary activity; indispensable to revolutionary action is the development of "class consciousness", the recognition of the proletariat of their 'alienated' powers which cannot be measured in terms of its own money wealth. For Lenin, the need for unity and organization is crucial, but since the proletariat is not in possession of the wealth accumulating capitalist system, it must find its power not in money solely, but in its strength as a well-disciplined political force. The "consciousness" of its own powers, as well as the realization of these powers is not left to changes in the economic structure; it is not a matter of waiting for the proletariat to become rich, or for the capitalist ruling class to give up its 'alienating' money system. It is not the possession of money alone which makes the proletariat (or Marx, for that matter), but other powers as well - powers which may be decisive, 'primary', or 'fundamental' in a way not adequately understood by a purely economic determinism.

Another aspect of Marx's theory of alienation which has enjoyed considerable interest in recent times is that which is related to his concept of the 'division of labor'. Coser and Howe attach considerable importance to this view: "No Marxist concept has been more fruitful than that of 'alienation'. As used by Marx, it suggests the psychic price of living in a society where the workers' 'deed becomes an alien power.' The division of labor, he writes,

makes the worker a cripple...forcing him to develop some highly specialized dexterity at the cost of a world of productive impulses... The worker becomes estranged from his work, both as process and product; his major energies must be expended upon tasks that have no organic or creative function with his life, the impersonality of the social relationships enforced by capitalism, together with the sense of incoherence and discontinuity induced by the modern factory, goes far toward making the worker a dehumanized part of the productive process rather than an autonomous human being."⁴⁴ Man, specialized in the industrial system becomes a dehumanized cog in the impersonal economic machine. Marx, therefore, attached considerable importance to man's efforts to free himself from this bondage to the industrial machine; he saw as a necessary condition for his personal development the control of man over this machine such that he would enjoy a 'shortening of the labor day'. In his increased leisure time, the individual could discover new talents, enrich himself culturally and intellectually, and engage in diversified pursuits which would allow him to grow more fully in accordance with his potential as a human being.

Marx believed that in a socialist society man could achieve mastery of the economic machine; that in such a society only could the conditions for man's self-creation be achieved. But many critics have been concerned to note

44. Coser, Lewis and How, Irving, "Images of Socialism", Voices of Dissent, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1958, p. 17.

that it does not follow from this that a socialist economic organization, the collective ownership of the industrial system, necessarily disposes of the alienations which are the part of the industrial system, particularly of the factory system. Some of the problems of alienation are due to the complexity of the industrial organization itself, whether that organization exists in a collective economy or in a capitalist economy. At any rate, socialism is a planned society which requires planners and plans; something of the success of socialism to solve industrial 'alienations' depends on the wisdom, the judgments, and also the determination, and moral persuasions of men. The struggle against alienations, as it is indicated in the polemics of Marxist literature, does not take place solely in the world of Necessity such that socialist economic organization will inevitably, necessarily remove the alienations of the 'division of labor.'

Chapter VII

The Meaning of Socialism

The question of freedom and necessity has important consequences upon the position taken by socialists in formulating the theory and practice of socialism. Something of these consequences is observable in current controversy among socialists themselves regarding the means and aims of socialism. What is socialism? For many socialists much of the meaning of socialism involves a criticism of the capitalist system and proposals for the correction of its defects,. Strachey, for example, considers the chief defect of capitalism to be its instability, characterized by lengthy periods of economic stagnation, overproduction, inflation and depression, unemployment and so forth - all ruinous for masses of people.⁴⁵ The key issue in the economic ills of capitalism, for Strachey, is to be found in the motivation of production; it is the exclusive motive of profit-making which makes the capitalist system unstable. Thus for some socialists, socialism represents a programme which would attack and remedy the production motivation of capitalism. By learning to control the capitalist economy, by altering its profit-making motivation the iniquities of the system - inequality, exploitation, wasteful competition, and strife - would be removed.

Some socialists such as C.A.R. Crosland ^{land} reject much that has been traditional in the socialist (particularly the Marxist) criticism of capitalism. In Crosland's view

45. Strachey, John, Contemporary Capitalism, Victor Gollaniz Ltd. London 1956, p. 203.

the old laissez-faire capitalism dominated by the profit motive has disappeared; so great has been the change in the economic system that the word capitalism is no longer adequate to explain it. The intervention of the state, reform measures, the need of producers to consider the demands of consumers, the influence of organized labor have exercised greater control of the capitalist economy and have introduced motives of production other than profit-making.⁴⁶

These views result in different conceptions of socialism. From an economic point of view, Strachey's socialism becomes principally concerned with stabilizing production and introducing non-profit motives in the economy. Crosland's view, too, calls for a revision of socialism to adapt itself to a new type of society in which the old 'insane' or 'destructive' capitalism no longer prevails. Paul T. Homan, in observing these trends in socialist theory has interpreted these positions as efforts to make capitalism work. He, too, rejects the old-line socialism which conceived of the liquidation of capitalism entirely. Since capitalism is no longer uncontrolled and unstable and since the poor have not become poorer, what, asks Homan, is the use of being a socialist? In fact, Homan argues, since American capitalism has worked so well in attaining not only economic well-being but moral and aesthetic objectives as well, there would appear to be little point in "scuttling such a wealth producing apparatus."⁴⁷

46. Crosland, p. 30ff.

47. Homan, Paul. T., see footnote 53.

In this discussion of the meaning of socialism, the Marxist introduces several objections. The analysis of present day capitalism made by Strachey, Crosland, and Homan is denied; capitalism remains subject to economic crises affecting the welfare of masses of people; prosperity in certain western capitalist countries has been brought about temporarily at the expense of colonial countries. In short, the Marxist denies that capitalism can be made to work. Also the suggestion that inequality has been reduced comes counter to the Marxist economic concept of inequality - the perpetuation of private ownership of the means of production in contradiction to the socialization of production creating classes, owners and non-owners.

But whatever the details of this economic controversy, the Marxist is confronted by a problem of the definition of socialism according to his acceptance of freedom or necessity. Logically, the Marxist who accepts the determinist position, that socialism in terms of the socialization of the ownership of the means of production, is inevitable, must regard as temporary aberrations the reformist trends in capitalism and in the theory of non-Marxists. Discussion of their proposals is merely academic, having no relationship to the actual socialist movement in the economic structure of society. What is the significance of the position of Strachey and Crosland, if socialism is inevitable? Their proposals are doomed to failure. But

for the Marxist who is influenced by Marxist concept of freedom, in that the choices that socialists make regarding socialist means and objectives, may influence the outcome of socialism, then the controversy which is taking place among socialists the political and moral controversy, the effort to demonstrate the superiority of one form of socialism over another, becomes significant - and may be regarded as having a most important bearing on how society is to be shaped.

The views of some socialists lead to a concept of economic organization which allows for the existence of both private ownership (Crosland suggests ninety percent) and public ownership. Some socialists argue that this concept of the "mixed economy" (which was approved, for example in the 1956 Winnipeg Declaration of the C.C.F. in Canada) is not socialism at all, but a form of Welfare State in which public support is given for the maintenance of capitalist enterprise. They have argued that in Britain, for example, the consequence of a policy of "mixed economy" is that Labour will have an increasing stake in capitalist economy. Those socialists such as Strachey and Crosland^{land} who accept in society a large sector of private ownership count as basic to the meaning of socialism the remedy of present economic and social ills. Thus if a "mixed economy" works, what is the point of striving for public ownership? These views are in opposition to the Marxist view that public ownership is the

only remedy and that such socialization is inevitable.

Thus there is present in the views of advocates of the "mixed economy", as well as in the view of socialists such as the Fabians, a conception of how socialism is to come about that is a rejection of the Marxist-Lenist determinist theory. For, as has been noted, Lenin argued the inevitability of revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist state; he and other Marxists demined that capitalism could be transformed to socialism by reform measures. Other socialists have argued that socialism would come into being through a process of evolutionary change through piecemeal reform. They further argued that since there would be no 'leap' or sudden transformation of capitalism, it would be objectionable to withhold reforms until after the revolution. The Socialist Union bases much of its position in defending the "mixed economy" on the successes which reform has demonstrated in England particularly in providing for full employment and other economic and social benefits.⁴⁸ Strachey attributes something of the weakness of the Marxist-Leninist approach to its failure to recognize the influence of reformism; "The basic communist error derives, in my opinion, from the Marxist theory of the State. They state, they declare is nothing but the instrument of the great capitalists. It is inherently

48. Socialist Union, p. 15.

incapable of understanding such activities as the application of the Keynesian techniques for peaceful purposes."⁴⁹ There is then in current discussion of socialism controversy regarding both the nature of socialist economic organization and the economic means of achieving a socialist society. Which is the more efficient, public ownership or the 'mixed economy'? Which is the way to achieve socialism, evolution or revolution?

The difficulty of resolving this controversy is further reflected in the discussion of the meaning of 'scientific socialism'. Since socialists are concerned to gain mastery of their economic environment, to establish control of it such as to make it work toward man's own purposes, some sort of understanding of economics and its relationship to general social well-being is considered imperative. Many socialists, therefore, are engaged in attempting to understand the economic and social interconnections in society, the causal relations between one economic factor and another, and the causal relations between the economic organization and social phenomena in general. It is the expectation from such study that at least rough predictions may be made; for predictability is a key to man's control of his environment. Socialism according to these socialists, must, unlike that of the utopians, be based on a rational and realistic expectation involving an understanding of possible results

49. Strachey, p. 246fn.

of economic measures. There are several difficulties for socialist^s in pursuing a 'scientific socialism; such as the sheer complexity of society, the multitude of causal interconnection which they discover, the lack of experience and observation of socialist societies, and the difficulty of conducting social experiment. For these reasons, considerable interest and importance is attached to the development of socialism in the Soviet Union and China, as well as in other socialist countries.

The concept of 'scientific socialism' is subject to qualifications according to the admission in social life of the existence of freedom. For if free will is recognized, then there are certain consequences upon the role played by science and upon its limitation. For the entry of free will, as with the presence of 'accident', introduces an element which is not subject to formulation into laws of necessity; at best, it calls for the formulation of probable laws subject to an element of unpredictability. It further recognizes that there are choices to be made among socialist methods and aims, and that these choices are not inevitable in the sense that they are predetermined. There may even be enough that is unpredictable or indeterminate to allow for an element of utopianism in socialist theory which does not draw a clear connection between socialist moral aims and socialist economic methods. But what is most significant is that the concept of scientific socialism which allows for freedom in social development makes it possible to present rational appeals to people in arguing in favor of one or

another of socialist routes. The making of decisions and choices opens the door to rational discussion.

But a strict application of Marx's economic determinism has certain consequences for the meaning of 'scientific socialism'. There is that aspect of the theory in which socialism is inevitable and in this, once this law has been recognized there would appear to be little use in reasoning about it - pros and cons in the matter make little sense as a basis for choosing between socialism and some other form of economic organization. There is also another aspect of the determinist theory which limits the role of reason - the position of the scientist himself in the base-superstructure relationship. For in this view of society, the scientist reflects or is determined by the economic base; there arises, therefore, class science, proletarian science and bourgeois science. He himself is subject in his thinking and in his scientific pursuits to necessary causal laws; in this way he is limited in the formulation of 'objective' laws of social development. His science is 'subjective' in that they are determined not by his reason but by his class affiliation.

The discussion of socialist economic organization, how it to be achieved, and how it is to be controlled involves underling philosophic assumptions regarding freedom and necessity. And the assumptions that are adopted, whether there is presence in the social world freedom or necessity or both, have important consequences for the theory and practice of socialism. In a general

way, the acceptance of freedom in socialist theory allows for the role of reason; whereas, its denial results in the rejection of human rationality.

Socialism is not, for most socialists, an economic question alone. There are several respects in which its economic considerations are linked to the political life of society. Since economic production is a social phenomena, affecting mass of people, the successes or failures of economic efficiency and the effects of economic decisions extend through many areas of the lives of many people, may depend upon the co-operation of the masses or upon the introduction of co-ercion of people to conform to economic decisions not made by them. Whatever the organization for carrying out economic measures, political questions are involved. G. D. H. Cole, for example, gives expression to the political nature of the socialist movement. In his view there is a compelling need for co-operative action if socialism is to be achieved; the individual alone is helpless in bringing about this objective. "In order to assert his claims, he has to make common cause with others who are similarly placed and suffer under an exploitation and imputation like their own. Common men need also to join hands in political associations for pressing their claims upon governments, and in due course for bringing government under their own control."⁵⁰ Thus for Cole, as well as for other socialists, particularly the Social Democrats, socialism involves the need for political action, a need

50.Cole, World Socialism Restated, p. 39.

imposed upon them by the collective nature of social life. And once a socialist economic organization has been achieved, its own collective nature requires that socialists continue to confront the problem of how masses of people are to exercise choice and control in matters affecting their own welfare in such a collective society. This question has become all the more important in the mind of such socialists as E. H. Carr since the growth of modern economies involves a complex of interdependent economic and social factors; a change in one sphere is likely to effect change in another area of life.

Whatever may be the position of the socialist regarding details of economic, they are likely to conceive of some sort of planning. For E. H. Carr, for example, the essence of socialism is in its control and planning of the economic organization.⁵¹ Such a view, as has been noted, is not inconsistent with Marx's view of the struggle of man for mastery of nature through control. But while Carr believes that only in socialism can democracy be achieved, he is concerned to point out the problem of the reconciliation needed between planning and democracy. Many socialists, in the humanist tradition, are similarly concerned with the problem of how a collective economy is to be operated with due regard for the rights of the individual. The danger, for many socialists, of a collective society is its propensity to become centralized in a despotic authority; socialist society may become vested in authority which is not amenable to popular political influence. This

51. Carr, p. 39.

possibility becomes greater as modern industrial technology, its planning and decision-making, becomes more complex and specialized. Thus for many socialists, such as Crosland, Carr, and Cole, there is no necessary relationship between a socialist economic organization of a collective nature and democracy; democracy, they argue, is not an inevitable outcome of the introduction of socialist economic organization. Cole, for example, regards socialism as an essential foundation for democracy, but that the exercise of democracy will depend upon the free play of human personality in pursuing an effective democratic society. The position that such socialists have taken has been reinforced by developments in the Soviet Union of despotic political activities; there exists historical evidence of the possibility that a socialist state may not be democratic.

Increasing interest is being shown by socialists and non-socialists alike in the differences which are being revealed in the political forms developing in various socialist countries. It has become apparent that the introduction of socialist economic organization alone does not determine the particular political framework in which it operates. Attempts in Yugoslavia, for example, to establish forms of "workers' control", have been met by controversy regarding the possibility of placing industrial management within a democratic framework. Salvadori, in his *Marxism*, attaches considerable importance to the Yugoslavian experiment. "The acceptance of Titoism would have as great an influence in the communist movement

as the acceptance of the fundamental political and intellectual tenets of Liberalism had ~~an~~ socialism of western and central Europe in the nineteenth century."⁵² Yet proposals to apply some of the tenets of nineteenth century Liberalism to twentieth century economic planning has met with some scepticism. The Socialist Union, for example, argues that to introduce the vote as a condition for industrial democracy would result in the lowering of standards of administration and open the door to corruption, Paul T. Homan argues that to place industrial management under the supervision of parliamentary committees would result in an obstruction of economic efficiency, for this would subject industrial operations to perpetual controversy. Arguments is thus presented against placing industry in a parliamentary framework.⁵³

In socialist discussion of democracy, particularly as it involves the question of parliamentary forms, much interest has been directed to the role played by the political party. Many socialists of the western parliamentary tradition are committed to the establishment of socialist society in the framework of party competition, claiming for this procedure the advantage that minority rights for political expression are protected and that these institutions allow for public debate, an essential condition if the masses are to make decisions. Yet the insistence by these socialists in maintaining parliamentary electoral procedures as the means of achieving socialism has important consequences on the significance of party action. Since most political

52. Salvadori, Massimo, The Rise of Modern Communism, Henry Holt and Co. New York, 1952, p. 75.

53. Homan, Paul T., The Socialist Union, New York, 1952, p. 75.

parties must seek to gain majority control of parliament, they may find it politically expedient to offer programmes which have the widest electoral appeal; in this, it may be necessary to make appeals not only to factory workers, but to other classes as well, including farmers and white-collar workers. This political expediency may result in the watering of socialist principles (for example, the abandonment of the idea of total public ownership), and the increasing similarities of the programmes of the several political parties. There may be also the tendency of political parties to consider the immediate needs and demands of the electorate, and thus emphasize immediate reforms.

Such a view of the role of the parliamentary party runs counter to the Marxist conception of the role of the Party. In Marxism, the Communist Party is a class instrument which reflects the interests of the proletariat, and which is inevitably the vanguard in the transformation of capitalism not by reformist measures but by revolutionary means. The acceptance of this determinist view of the party has important consequences for the Marxist conception of democracy. In Cole's interpretation, "According to Marx's determinist doctrine there could be only one right course, marked out by the development of the economic forces. Accordingly there had to be a central determinism of party policy to ensure that this one right course should be followed. 'Democratic' centralism, the laying down at the centre, after debate within the party of a line which every party member must accept, without further question,

logically followed. The party became a dictatorship over the workers."⁵⁴ It might be added that in the determinist view, the Communist Party will inevitably triumph.

In formulating political theory and practice, socialists are led to various positions on a basis of their assumption of the concept of freedom or necessity. If socialist economic organization may be placed in either a democratic or a dictatorial framework, then it may be that the political will of the people may be a decisive factor in determining which form is to be achieved. There is in the polemics of both Marxian and non-Marxian socialists indication of the assumption that men by the exercise of political will may bring about socialism and influence the quality of the political life of that society. The strict economic determinism, on the other hand, leads to an opposite view. Socialism is inevitable, and it is to be brought about inevitably by revolutionary means under the guidance of a proletarian party, the Communist Party and once having been established it will, by its very nature as a classless society, produce democracy. Movements which are counter to these absolute laws of social development are doomed to frustration. There is no political action which can deter or alter the laws of social development; in this, men have no choice, the movement (such as the transformation of capitalism to socialism) occur independently of men's wills. There is thus the implication that political activity is impotent.

54. Cole, G.D.H., What is Socialism? Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1954, p. 176.

Many socialists, particularly of the western humanist tradition, regard socialism as essentially ethical, a quest for a more moral society. In attempting to define socialism ^{and} C. A. R. Crosman, for example, contends that its moral assumptions are fundamental to the meaning of socialism. "The one single element common to all the schools of thought has been the basic aspirations, the underlying moral values. It follows that these embody the only logically and historically permissible meaning of the word socialism..."⁵⁵ Much of the appeal of socialism has involved the acceptance of humanist moral values in its criticism of capitalist morality. Capitalism represents a society which fosters ruthless competition and strife among individuals and the acceptance of values in which individualism means, as Cole has contended, the right of "a few individuals to ride roughshod over the rest". Moral censure of capitalism is directed toward such social behaviour as the exploitation of man by man such that wealth and privilege are extended to the predatory few at the expense of the masses of toilers. There has, according to this criticism, been created a society in which masses of people suffer the economic dislocations of an economic system whose motive is profit-making, and not the general welfare of all. Capitalism is characterized by the existence, therefore, of inequality among people not only of their economic lot, but in terms of their personal freedom. Socialism, in contrast, has come to represent

55. Crosland, p. 216.

for many socialists a higher moral order, one in which social strife and ruthless competition is replaced by a brotherhood of man, exploitation of the many by the few is replaced by the harmony of the interests of the individual with those of the community at large, and inequality of privilege, justice, personal freedom are abolished. All of these values relate to the humanist principles of the Rights of Man, including the concept of the worth and dignity of the individual.

There is in this moral approach to socialism underlying assumptions about the nature of man and of the possibilities for his personal development. What is Socialist Man? While socialists may not agree in detail, they may sketch roughly some of the values which give shape to their image of the potentiality of man in a socialist society, values that man ought to pursue. These values may include; health and fruitful longevity rather than sickness and premature death, abundance of the material needs for survival rather than scarcity, love rather than hate, reason and knowledge rather than irrationality and ignorance, brotherhood and charity rather than strife and cruelty, generosity rather than greed, beauty rather than ugliness. There underlies such a conception of human possibility the assumption that man is capable of change, that since his nature is not fixed or that society is not necessarily motivated by a natural strife in a struggle of the "survival of the fittest", he is able to perfect himself in accordance with his moral concept. In addition to the idea of the perfectibility

of man, there is also the assumption of the closely related idea of progress. For socialists, a socialist movement and a socialist society are progressive, not only in their quest for an abundance of material needs, but also in its quest for a higher moral order, involving direction toward the flowering of rationality and aesthetic values. Whatever may be the determining conditions, natural or social, which impose themselves upon man, he is capable of exerting his will in such a way that he may utilize or change these conditions in order to create the conditions for his own growth in accordance with his own moral plan. This involves the solution of how man may develop as a unique individual in harmony with the interests of all. Socialism represents for many socialists the road to the solution of this basic moral problem.

The acceptance of a moral bias has an important consequence upon the meaning of socialism. For in the proposals regarding socialist economic organization, in the methods of planning and control, the criteria of the success or failure of economic measures is to be based on moral consideration, on the success these have in achieving the conditions for the fulfillment of socialist moral aims. Socialist economic organization is an instrument which must work according to man's motivations. It follows from this that if specific economic techniques result in the curtailment of personal liberties, then these aspects of socialism must be altered or scrapped. Controversy among socialists regarding methods most conducive to the achievement of moral aims must give answer to the moral

claims made by proponents of capitalism. If some form of capitalism may be deemed to offer the greatest potential for personal freedom, then the socialist who adopts a moral bias may be committed to support this form. If capitalism is no longer the evil that it once was, or if such a society as is described by the term 'peoples' capitalism' may offer the greatest moral and aesthetic values, then such an economic organization may deserve, on moral grounds, the support of socialists themselves. What a socialist society is to become economically depends on what will create a society conducive to the attainment of man's moral or spiritual values.

The introduction into discussion of socialism of morality is based upon the philosophic assumption that man has a degree of freedom in which moral choice is possible; man may act morally or immorally, and he has the freedom to choose one sort of society rather than another. For some socialists the concept of moral freedom leads to acceptance of the significance and efficiency of moral persuasion. Cole, for example, says, "I have always seen Socialism, not as historically necessary or determined but as the embodiment of a social order which will decent men and women ought to want..."⁵⁶ Socialism is to be brought about by the intervention of human will basing its direction on moral persuasions. Man is free to reject to accept socialist aim^s, and upon this the course of socialism may depend.

Such a socialist position is in contradiction to

56. Cole, World Socialism Restated, p. 5.

Marx's theory of economic determinism. While Marxists do maintain that a socialist society will see the creation of a proletarian ethics which is "higher" and which, as Howard Selsam contends, will be pronounced as good, this society will come about not because men want it to or because men believe that it ought to come about, but because it will come inevitably as a necessary law of social development of society. Existing moral codes and moral struggle are reflections of the class society of capitalism; a change in moral outlook and conflict will come about as capitalism is transformed to socialism. Thus socialism will not come about because men judge that it ought morally to be secured, but men will judge what is moral according to the stage of economic development. There exists in this view of the operation of inexorable laws of social development the consequence that society and social development is amoral.

But as has been elaborated, Marx also presented a view which allows for both freedom and necessity. What then is the meaning of Marxian socialism, and what is its relationship to socialist movement as a whole? It follows from the presence in Marxist theory that its meaning and its affinity to other socialist movements is ambivalent. In its acceptance of freedom it is within the mainstream of humanist socialism; and in its denial of freedom it constitutes an abrupt departure from the moral bias of other forms of socialism.

Chapter VIII

Summary and Conclusion

There exists in Marxian literature, in both the writings of Marx himself and in those of his ^mexponents to the present day, two irreconcilable theories of social development - one which places all social phenomena in a determined world, and another which admits of a degree of freedom within an otherwise determined world. This irreconcilability results in the presence of two possible interpretations of the meaning of socialist theory and practice. If the ~~d~~eterminist position is held, then socialism represents a particular social development which is the inevitable outcome of the contradictions between the increasing socialization of production, on the one hand, and private ownership of the means of production and of finance-capital on the other hand. All sorts of economic and social crises such as unemployment and depression, poverty and inequality, class strife and wars are products of the economic contradictions in capitalist society. When these contradictions are resolved, when socialized production becomes socially owned, then such social ills will disappear. But the removal of these contradictions will come about in accordance with necessary, inexorable laws of social development.

In the transformation of capitalism to socialism it is inevitable that people will behave in such a way as to conform to the eventual working out of the basic economic pattern. People will inevitably do the thing they do because they reflect this basic economic order of development. Human will, even if it were admitted into the system, could not alter the inevitable outcome of the laws of social development, of the transformation of capitalism to socialism. But because the transformation of capitalism to socialism does not involve a sudden leap, there will inevitably be a period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in which socialism will be protected from the possibility of a regression into reaction from remnants of the old capitalist order. Since such a "dictatorship" will necessarily have a leadership, it will be inevitable that the transformation of society will be characterized by the presence in political and economic affairs of a Communist Party. All of these social phenomena are inevitable outcomes of the economic contradictions inherent in the capitalist system. And the laws of social development, of the resolution of economic antagonisms, operate independently of men's wills; indeed, man's own activities are to be understood as occurring within this inevitable process; they, too, are responding in a determined way to the necessary laws of social development. If men believe that they act with a will of their own, then they are victims of an illusion. Polemical appeals made to the working

class to unite are not understandable as representing the ability of men to act in one way rather than another, but are themselves reflections of conditions of the economic base. It is inevitable that the working class will unite.

The moral judgments of men, too, are subject to the laws of social development; morality, as a set of codes, is conditioned by the basic forces of economic production. There are codes which represent the interests of the capitalist and codes which represent the interests of the proletariat; these are in contradiction just as are the relations of production. But the proletarian ethics is to prevail inevitably as socialism is achieved and as capitalism and its morality disappear. But it is not to be understood that moral persuasion or the belief that socialism represents a better kind of society determines the outcome of the economic and social process. What people want or do not want morally will not alter the inevitability of socialism. But since it is a law of social development that people accept the morality of the chief classes of society, and since in socialism all people will be in the same economic relationship to the means of production, people will inevitably accept the morality of this classless society. In the struggle to achieve socialism, moral appeal is questionable; for it makes no sense to appeal to people that they ought to want a morally better world

when, in fact, they will want it. And then, it must be understood that such talk of morality is not to imply, in a science of socialism, the notion that men may make moral judgments or actions in the sense that they are doing so according to their own free will; such a view is in contradiction to the laws of social development which says that morality is the product of class division, which, in turn is the product of the basic economic organization of society. Socialism will be judged to be a better world. As a result of the development of socialist economic organization it will remove class strife and its consequent social ills. It will release now inhibited creative powers which will afford an abundance of the material and cultural needs for all; exploitation will no longer exist as a class phenomenon, unmerited privilege accruing to private owners will become unknown, and people will enjoy the fullest possible growth of their individualities.

But all of this takes place in the "realm of necessity". Thus the view of socialism which is maintained in this determined realm is amoral in the sense that men do not make moral choices according to their own free will, nor does such moral judgment affect the operation of the inevitable economic development. This determinist position further results in a view of the

irrationality of man in the sense that man does not make rational critical judgments according to any will of his own but rather he is determined in his thinking by the stage of economic development and his relationship to the means of production.

A theory of social development which allows for both freedom and necessity has certain consequences on the nature of socialism, contradictory to that which results from the determinist view. There are all sorts of material and social conditions which limit the ~~extend~~ of man's freedom; such factors as the State, the lack of class consciousness of the working class, the influence of propaganda and so forth may be obstacles to socialism. But, having judged a socialist society to be a morally better society made possible by the introduction of a socialist economic organization, men through their own human will and effort, stimulated by their moral persuasions, may strive to achieve a socialist society. Political effort may be a decisive factor; it is in this sense that the Marxist call to the workers of the world to unite, of the importance of Party organization and polemics can properly be understood. In the transformation of capitalism to socialism, the outcome and direction of social development, is subject, not only to material conditions but to human will and determination.

Because men, in this view, may make a choice for

or against what socialists regard as a morally better society, moral persuasion, moral responsibility, moral condemnation which enters into the struggle for socialism may be understood. The presence of a moral will in society allows for the recognition that some people in protecting their own interests may choose actions which are immoral in that they may deprive others of their human rights. But this moral presence does not cease to operate once a socialist economic organization is introduced. Socialists argue that only in a socialist society may the principles of humanism be brought about; but it does not follow from this that the practice of these principles will come about necessarily, without human will, from the economic organization. Morality in the sense that man is free to choose between right and wrong prevails in a socialist society. Thus in the view which accepts both Freedom and Necessity, socialism represents a moral order and also a rational one; both morality and reason enter into the creation of society and of man.

Thus the basic philosophic position that social life is characterized by the presence of both freedom and necessity has a bearing upon the meaning of both the theory and practice of Marxian socialism. As has been

noted, the acceptance of human will which may be consciously directed to the influence of social development allows for the maintenance of a policy of political activism. Thus the political polemics and tactics, such as the appeal to unity and determination of the working class and declarations of the importance of party leadership and organization in political struggle are given real meaning. There is permitted speculation that consciously directed political action, as is suggested in Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune, in the polemics of the Communist Manifesto, and in much of the Marxist polemics generally, may be a decisive factor in social development. However, it must be noted that the acceptance of the efficacy of political will may leave open the discussion of the inevitability of military revolution. For political will and the attainment of political power by socialist parties may make possible political tactics which accord with men's moral wants: it may allow for political action which accepts the possibility that socialism may be achieved, by the exercise of human will and determination, not necessarily by violent revolution, but by peaceful evolution. Thus the content of the polemics of the Marxists may with consistency be orientated toward peaceful means.

At any rate, the acceptance that there are choices to be made between possible forms of political struggle may foster discussion of such matters in the arena of public debate; and in doing so, while Marxists may argue against the policies of other socialist parties, it retains its affinity to them in terms of fundamental liberal ideals.

A similar consequence accrues for Marxist socialism regarding its moral outlook. As has been noted, if an element of freedom is accepted, the actual moral experience of Marxists themselves as expressed in their polemics, may be counted as real and significant; if men have choices of actions on moral grounds, if they are morally free to decide between one sort of society rather than another, then the Marxist moral criticisms and aims are given meaning as real experience. But if the Marxist accepts this view, then he is committed to the moral preoccupation of weighing the ethical content of socialist means and ends; if other men may act in a moral order, so then must the Marxist. At any rate, Marxist socialist proposals and economic measures must be subject to critical examination of the moral consequences. There are several ways in which this position places Marxism within the mainstream of the humanist tradition, in which many critics believe Marx himself properly belonged. It makes consistent to its basic philosophic position, the acceptance of a degree

of freedom, its claims for the humanist values of equality, fraternity, and liberty. It, further, rejects the mechanistic view that man is like some complex, organism simply reflecting conditions or being driven by necessity; man may secure mastery of his own nature and of the material conditions in which he lives.

There is a further consequence of the acceptance of freedom and necessity, for the Marxist analysis of historical development becomes consistent not only to its underlying assumptions but to actual historical conditions. For this view allows for the importance of the role of ideas and, therefore, of its concept of the ideological struggle. Thus it is able to give account for the significance of the role of Marxist theory itself in historical development. Marxist ideas, the use to which they are put, the methods by which they are consciously derived and tested are thus products, at least in part, of human will and rational effort, and must be considered in an interpretation of historical development. Marxist literature does, in fact, ascribe importance to the role of socialist ideology in its analysis of the development of socialist countries. And recently it has given support to the importance of the idea of peaceful co-existence in leading support to the peace movements. In its historical analysis human will and ideology makes possible the prospect of the prevention of war.

And just as ideas are thus represented in history, so, too, is the role of the individual. Marxist literature in its appreciation of the roles of Marx, Lenin and Engels

suggest the importance attributed to the will and effort of such individuals in shaping the course of history, and of socialist development in particular. As has been elaborated the presence of moral choice was open to such an individual as Stalin in the development of society in the Soviet Union. The acceptance of free will accords with its own belief of what the social world is like.

It must be noted that the acceptance of freedom has an important consequence for the Marxist concept of 'scientific socialism'. For the admission of freewill allows for an indeterminism in the analysis of social development; it poses a problem for scientific prediction and for the formulation of necessary laws. It, furthermore, places its own formulations and its application in practice in a position dependent, not merely upon material or economic conditions, but also upon the extent of human moral and rational will. It allows for the conception of 'scientific socialism' as a means, based upon what understanding of society is possible where freedom exists, as an instrument which socialists may use consciously and rationally to further (or to deter, as the case may be) its social aims. Such a science must recognize the possible disconnection between socialist economic organization and democracy, and the recognition that 'scientific planning' is subject to a degree of free will in directing its plans toward preconceived moral and political aspirations.

The acceptance or rejection, therefore, or either of the two philosophic positions of Marx - that the social world develops in the realm of necessity, on the one hand, and that, on the other hand, it develops in the realm of

both freedom and necessity - has the most important consequences for the meaning of Marxian socialism in both theory and practice, and in its validity in interpreting historical reality.

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1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations

which are satisfied by the functions u_i and v_i in the domain G .

2. In the second part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

on the boundary ∂G . It is shown that under these conditions the system of equations has a unique solution in the domain G .

3. In the third part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

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4. In the fourth part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

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5. In the fifth part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

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6. In the sixth part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

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7. In the seventh part we consider the case when the functions u_i and v_i are assumed to be continuous in the domain G and satisfy the boundary conditions

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